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FLEXIBLE HARDWARE ACCELERATION
FOR INSTRUCTION-GRAIN LIFEGUARDS
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
INSTRUCTION-GRAIN LIFEGUARDS MONITOR EXECUTING PROGRAMS AT THE GRANULARITY
OF INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTIONS TO QUICKLY DETECT BUGS AND SECURITY ATTACKS,
BUT THEIR FINE-GRAIN NATURE INCURS HIGH MONITORING OVERHEADS. THIS ARTICLE
IDENTIFIES THREE COMMON SOURCES OF THESE OVERHEADS AND PROPOSES THREE
TECHNIQUES THAT TOGETHER CONSTITUTE A GENERAL-PURPOSE HARDWARE ACCELERA-
TION FRAMEWORK FOR LIFEGUARDS.
......Systems designers have tradition-
ally focused on maximizing performance,
and more recently on minimizing power.
From a user’s perspective, however, both
issues are of secondary concern when the
software is misbehaving. As systems have
become faster over the years, the correspond-
ing increases in both software and hardware
complexity have raised concerns that applica-
tions and systems are becoming increasingly
error prone. Although writing bug-free
code has always been difficult, recent studies
suggest that bug rates are getting worse over
time as software complexity increases,1
despite the software industry’s prerelease test-
ing efforts. In a networked world, even
obscure bugs (benign under normal condi-
tions) can leave a system vulnerable to secur-
ity attacks after the code has been released.
There is a long history of developing tools
to help diagnose and fix software problems at
various phases of the software development
and execution cycle: static tools attempt
to identify problems before the program
executes, postmortem tools attempt to
reconstruct what went wrong after the appli-
cation crashes, and dynamic tools—or
lifeguards—monitor an application as it
executes to diagnose and hopefully either
contain or fix problems. Instruction-grain life-
guards, which perform invariant checking at
the granularity of individual instructions,
have two unique advantages. First, they
have access to highly detailed information
regarding dynamic events at the instruction
level, such as memory references, address
computations, and information flow. Sec-
ond, software errors may be captured earlier
and more accurately. The former enables a
wide range of powerful lifeguards, for exam-
ple, detecting memory-access violations, data
races, and security exploits. The latter pro-
vides a better starting point for damage con-
tainment, on-site diagnosis,2 and, hopefully,
on-the-fly fixes and recovery.3
Unfortunately, software-only instruction-
grain lifeguards, which are mainly based on
dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI),4,5 typ-
ically slow down themonitored program by 10
to 100 times,4 because lifeguard functionality is
invoked on nearly every instruction. To address
this overhead, researchers have proposed sev-
eral hardware optimizations, each tailored to
a specific class of lifeguards: for example,
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memory-access monitoring,6-7 data-race detec-
tion,8 and information-flow tracking with
simple metadata.9-11 However, each of these
mechanisms is useful only for the narrow
class of lifeguards that it supports. Other stud-
ies have proposed more general-purpose
hardware solutions. For example, our previous
study proposed log-based architectures (LBA)12,
which captures a log from a monitored pro-
gram and ships it to another on-chip core
that executes the monitoring functionality
(see the ‘‘Log-Based Architectures’’ sidebar
for more details on this approach). An earlier
study13 proposed dynamic instruction stream
editing (DISE), which performs pattern-
matching based dynamic rewriting of a pro-
cessor’s instruction stream to insert calls to
monitoring code. Both DISE and our earlier
work on LBA focus only on reducing the
costs of DBI, such as reducing the resource
competition between monitored programs
and lifeguards. As a result, the instruction-
grain monitoring overhead, although signifi-
cantly reduced, is still large (for example, 3 to
5 slowdowns12).
We believe that the key to long-term
impact is fast and flexible lifeguards, for sev-
eral reasons. First, lifeguards that are too slow
will not be used in the field, as we observe
today. Second, the set of important applica-
tions continues to change significantly over
time. Third, researchers are actively creating
increasingly sophisticated lifeguard algo-
rithms to model and track increasingly subtle
and complex software correctness problems.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
security attacks evolve quickly over time in
response to new defenses; hence, we need
software’s flexibility to adapt to these
quickly changing threats. Therefore, our
goal in this article is to provide hardware
accelerators for a wide range of instruction-
grain lifeguards.
We analyze several diverse lifeguards (see
the ‘‘Example Instruction-Grain Lifeguards’’
sidebar for their descriptions) and identify
three main sources of lifeguard overheads.
Then, we propose a hardware acceleration
framework highlighted by three novel
techniques for addressing these overheads:
inheritance tracking (IT) for accelerating
propagation style metadata updates, idempo-
tent filters (IF) for accelerating metadata
checks, and metadata-TLBs (M-TLB) for
accelerating the translation from application
address to metadata address. Finally, we
implement our techniques within LBA and
evaluate them through simulation studies.
Experimental results show that our framework
reduces overheads by 2 to 3 for all of the
studied lifeguards over the previous state-of-
the-art—down to 2 to 51 percent overall
slowdowns for all but one of the lifeguards.
Analyzing instruction-grain lifeguards
Figure 1 depicts the general setting we
consider, reflecting existing general-purpose
lifeguard platforms such as DISE and
LBA. On the left, an event-capture run-
time observes the instructions executed
by the monitored program and creates a
corresponding stream of event records.
mmi2009010062.3d 31/1/09 15:48 Page 63
rare events
update events
Event-capture
runtime
(for example,
DISE, LBA)
Application
Event
mux
Malloc/free - R
Lock/unlock - R
Syscalls, etc. - R
Addr. computation - C
Memory access - C
Data movement - U
Computation - U
R
ar
e
Fr
eq
ue
nt
Event stream Lifeguard
R r  v ts
Update metadata
Check metadata
H
an
d
le
rs
Metadata
Allocation/
initialization
R
C
U
M-TLB
IF
IT
Figure 1. Our framework targets three common sources of lifeguard overheads: metadata updates via inheritance tracking
(IT), metadata checks via idempotent filters (IF), and metadata mapping via metadata-TLB (M-TLB).
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Log-Based Architectures: Exploiting Multicores for Lifeguards
Although multicore scaling makes software reliability more challenging (because of the challenges of
parallel programming), it also provides the much-needed hardware resources to include architectural sup-
port for instruction-grain monitoring. Log-based architectures (LBA) exploits multicore resources to offer a
general-purpose lifeguard support platform that runs the monitored application and the lifeguard on sep-
arate cores. Given users’ relative preferences of performance, power, and correctness, LBA lets users
dynamically enable lifeguard monitoring.
Figure A shows the LBA components, with a lifeguard running on core 2 monitoring an unmodified appli-
cation running on core 1. As an application instruction retires, LBA captures a record, compresses it, and
transports it through a buffer in the on-chip cache. An instruction record consists of the program counter,
instruction type, input/output operand identifiers, and any data addresses (the compressed log records are
less than a byte). In addition, LBA supports software-inserted annotation records representing high-level
events (such as malloc library calls), which can be captured via wrapper libraries. The consumer com-
ponents support event-driven execution. A lifeguard is organized as a set of event handlers registered with
LBA in an event type configuration table (ETCT). Every handler ends with a special instruction—nlba (next
LBA event)—which examines log records, looks up the ETCT, and transfers program control to the regis-
tered handler for the next event. Certain event values (such as data addresses) are automatically placed in
registers for ready handler access. LBA reduces the producer-consumer synchronization overhead by using
a large log buffer (64 Kbytes to 1 Mbyte); however, if the buffer becomes full, the application must stall,
and if the buffer becomes empty, the lifeguard must stall. Because of the decoupled execution and check-
ing, bug detection at the lifeguard lags bug occurrence at the application. LBA relies on OS-level support
for fault containment: The monitored application is stalled at syscalls until the lifeguard finishes checking
the remaining records in the log buffer; this prevents any damage from propagating into the OS kernel and
affecting other applications.
Compared to dynamic binary instrumentation, which runs a version of the application code that is
dynamically modified to embed lifeguard functionality, LBA significantly reduces the performance over-
head by avoiding the contention between the application and lifeguard functions for per-core hardware
resources (such as registers and the L1 cache), and by streamlining event capture and delivery. Compared
to hardware mechanisms specialized for particular types of lifeguards, LBA targets lifeguards written in
software, and thus achieves the flexibility for supporting a wide range of existing and emerging
lifeguards.
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Figure A. Log-based architectures (LBA) on a multicore processor, including the
components proposed in this article.
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Example Instruction-Grain Lifeguards
We focus on the following five diverse instruction-grain lifeguards that detect memory violations, security
exploits, and data races in our study.
AddrCheck
AddrCheck checks whether every memory access is to an allocated region of memory.1 By intercepting mem-
ory allocation routines such as malloc and free, AddrCheck maintains one-bit metadata for each byte of
the monitored program’s address space indicating whether or not that byte is currently accessible. AddrCheck
checks the metadata for every memory access.
MemCheck
MemCheck extends AddrCheck to detect the use of uninitialized values.2 For this purpose, it maintains one
‘‘initialized’’ bit per address byte and the ‘‘initialized’’ state per register in addition to the ‘‘accessible’’ bit. A memory
load of an uninitialized value is not an error in itself (for example, copying a partially initialized structure). Rather,
MemCheck raises an error only if uninitialized values are dereferenced as pointers, used in conditional tests, or passed
into system calls. To achieve this, MemCheck tracks the propagation of uninitialized values in the monitored program:
For every executed instruction, the destination becomes uninitialized if at least one of the sources is uninitialized.
TaintCheck
TaintCheck detects overwrite-related security exploits, such as buffer overflow and format string attacks.3
The metadata is one ‘‘tainted’’ bit per address byte of the monitored program and the ‘‘tainted’’ state per regis-
ter. TaintCheck marks all unverified program input data, such as data from the network, as suspect, or tainted.
Subsequently, it carefully tracks the propagation of tainted data through the program. If a tainted value is loaded
from memory, TaintCheck marks the destination register as tainted. It marks a computation destination as tainted
if a source is tainted. It raises an error if the program uses tainted data in critical ways, such as in jump target
addresses, printf-like format strings, or system call arguments.
TaintCheck with detailed tracking
We also study a TaintCheck variant that records a history of the taint propagation, using an 8-byte metadata
structure (4-byte ‘‘from’’ address, 4-byte instruction pointer) per 4-byte application word. Upon detection, this
lifeguard can reconstruct a taint propagation trail.
LockSet
LockSet detects data races by checking whether the monitored program follows a consistent locking
principle.4 For each thread t, LockSet maintains the current set St of locks held by the thread. For
each shared memory location m, it maintains a candidate set Sm of locks. LockSet knows m to be a shared
location if a second thread accesses it; at this moment, Sm is initialized with the current lock set of the
second thread. Afterwards, whenever a thread t references m, Sm is set to Sm \ St. If Sm ever becomes
empty, no consistent common lock set protects accesses to m, and LockSet raises an error. A LockSet
structure is a list of lock addresses. For every 4-byte word in the monitored program, the metadata is
a 32-bit record consisting of a compressed 30-bit pointer to the actual LockSet and a 2-bit state (indicating
virgin, exclusive, shared read-only, or shared read-write) for the location.
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The dashed box on the left shows examples
of rare and frequent events of interest. On the
right, a lifeguard tracks the application’s state
(for example, which memory regions have
been allocated) by maintaining metadata
regarding the monitored application’s address
space, often including application registers.
To consume the event stream, the lifeguard
issues event handlers that can update its meta-
data, use the metadata to check the event
against some invariant, or do both.
As Figure 1 and the lifeguard descrip-
tions in the sidebar show, the role of
many instruction-grain event handlers centers
on accessing lifeguard metadata. We have iden-
tified three main sources of overheads for
instruction-grain lifeguards as follows.
Propagation-style metadata updates
Whereas some metadata (such as Addr-
Check’s accessible bits) are modified only at
infrequent events such as library calls, others
are updated at nearly every monitored instruc-
tion. These more frequently modified types of
metadata arise in propagation-tracking (also
known as dynamic information flow track-
ing9-11) lifeguards such as MemCheck and
TaintCheck, which propagate metadata states
from sources to destinations on every instruc-
tion. Because each metadata update takes
multiple instructions to perform, propagation
tracking is a key source of lifeguard overhead.
Metadata checks
Lifeguard event handlers often perform
checks for instruction-grain events (for exam-
ple, for every application memory access in
AddrCheck and MemCheck, and for every
shared memory access in LockSet). Intui-
tively, in a well-behaved program, metadata
converge into stable states quickly. Lifeguard
event handlers can exploit this insight by
checking the frequent case—stable state—in
a fast path while branching into a slow
path for more detailed checks. However,
even the most optimized checking operation
must perform metadata access, comparison,
and branch. Thus, metadata checks are a sec-
ond key source of lifeguard overhead.
Metadata mapping
Metadata mapping occurs when a life-
guard event handler maps an address of the
monitored application into a metadata loca-
tion (for example, when AddrCheck maps
an application address to an accessible bit).
This operation involves a sequence of mask
and shift instructions, which often takes a sig-
nificant portion of handler instructions (as
high as half of the instructions in the example
lifeguards). Because this translation is required
for every metadata check and update in all our
lifeguards, metadata mapping is a third key
source of lifeguard overhead.
Differences in metadata use demand flexibility
Finally, as the lifeguard descriptions make
clear, there are several important differences in
the way that lifeguards use metadata:
 metadata unit (memory or register, per-
byte or per-word);
 metadata bits per unit (1 to 64 bits);
 metadata semantics; and
 whether metadata require propagation
tracking.
These differences demand flexibility in
the underlying support platform.
Inheritance tracking for propagation-style
metadata updates
Propagation-style lifeguards must be trig-
gered for nearly every instruction event for
tracking data flow, yielding high monitoring
overhead. Previous studies proposed hard-
ware designs that extend processor pipelines
to automatically access and propagate meta-
data along with the operations in the moni-
tored program.9-11 A fundamental limitation
in these approaches is that because the hard-
ware must understand metadata formats,
simplifying assumptions about metadata
must be made, so that the hardware supports
only a single lifeguard or, at best, only a par-
ticular metadata size and organization. As a
result, even simple modifications to life-
guards that perform well in their unmodified
form, such as the addition of detailed track-
ing to TaintCheck, can reduce the lifeguard’s
performance from an acceptable level to a
prohibitively low one.
We address this limitation by exploiting
a common feature of propagation-style
lifeguards: Metadata propagations follow
the monitored program’s dataflow structure.
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We propose tracking data inheritance instead
of propagating metadata values in hardware.
For example, consider a monitored instruction
‘‘mov A, %eax’’, which moves the data in
memory location A into register %eax.
A value-tracking mechanism would move
A’s metadata to %eax’s metadata, whereas
inheritance-tracking hardware records that
%eax inherits from A. By separating the track-
ing of inheritance from the propagation of
metadata values, the hardware does not need
to comprehend the metadata organization,
thereby supporting a wider range of lifeguards.
Unary inheritance tracking
Inheritance tracking is particularly useful for
eliminating events associated with the flow of
data through registers. Consequently, an initial
sketch employs a small shadow register file that
associates each architectural register with the
addresses from which it inherits. However,
with generic propagation, a particular register
can inherit from multiple ancestors, and the
number of ancestors can grow exponentially.
Fortunately, in many situations, we
can track unary propagation instead of
generic propagation. Here, unary propaga-
tion includes single-source, single-destination
(‘‘copy’’) operations, as well as binary com-
putations that use an immediate value as a
source operand. We assume that nonunary
operations (those that combine more than
one metadata source) propagate a ‘‘clean’’
result to the destination. Although at first
thought this assumption might appear too
liberal, we argue it is valid if
1. the lifeguard reports an error if a source
of a nonunary operation is unclean, or
2. the semantics underlying the metadata
values imply that, for all practical pur-
poses, the result of a nonunary opera-
tion is a clean value.
Perhaps surprisingly, both MemCheck and
TaintCheck are candidates for unary inheri-
tance tracking: MemCheck satisfies property
1, and TaintCheck satisfies property 2.
Unary IT for MemCheck
MemCheck tracks the propagation
of uninitialized values for avoiding false
positives and reports errors when an
uninitialized value is used for a pointer der-
eference, conditional test input, or system
call input. Although this lazy evaluation
eventually catches the use of uninitialized
memory, an eager evaluation that flags the
first use of an uninitialized value in a non-
unary computation is equally valid (for
example, flagging when uninitialized values
are added). MemCheck modified in this
way checks the source operands of nonunary
operations and treats the destination oper-
ands as initialized, thus avoiding a cascade
of error reports all based on the same unini-
tialized value.
Unary IT for TaintCheck
TaintCheck tracks the propagation
of memory taint values to detect memory
overwrite-based security exploits. For all
practical purposes, unary propagation pro-
vides good support for detecting such
exploits. First, the literature on security
reports that overwrite attacks (such as buffer
overflow) rely almost exclusively on direct
copying.14 Second, third-party analysts typi-
cally identify overwrite-based security vulner-
abilities in proprietary software by causing a
software crash through the introduction of
a long input composed of a known pattern
(such as repeating 055). A vulnerability is
identified if the pattern is observed in specific
locations in the core dump. Because this
technique relies on a direct (unary) propaga-
tion of the input, any identified vulnerability
(present and in the future) will be protected
by unary-only propagation. Third, we analyzed
the first six months of MITRE’s Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures security alert
entries in 2007 (CVE, http://cve.mitre.org).
For the entries involving open source soft-
ware, we studied the source-code patches
and found that every memory overwrite vul-
nerability was due to unary propagation.
Finally, although there is always a concern
that attackers can specifically work around
unary-only propagation, TaintCheck identi-
fies attacks before any attacking code exe-
cutes. Thus, the attack is constrained to
exploit the original application code, not
any injected code, which is substantially
more challenging to proceed against. For
these reasons, we believe that assuming taint-
edness does not propagate through nonunary
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operations represents a good performance/
coverage trade-off.
A unary IT design
By limiting inheritance tracking to unary
propagation, each register in the inheritance
table described earlier can be associated
with at most one source—making such a
structure feasible. Figure 2 presents a hard-
ware design for unary inheritance tracking.
We use the IT table to hold inheritance
information for each general-purpose regis-
ter. Each entry either specifies the memory
address from which the register inherits or
indicates that the register is ‘‘clean.’’ A
third state, ‘‘in lifeguard,’’ means that the
hardware has delivered the register state to
the lifeguard. For each incoming original
propagation event, we look up the state tran-
sition and action table using the event
type and the state of the source register.
The action is either to update an entry in
the IT table, to deliver an event to the life-
guard, or to simply discard the event. The
conflict detection logic detects any incoming
event E whose destination address overlaps
existing inherit-from addresses. In such cases,
the affected IT states are delivered to the life-
guards (with ‘‘mem_to_reg’’ events) before
event E, thus guaranteeing that lifeguards
always see the correct event order.
Because the IT mechanism processes
many of the events without invoking the life-
guard, this design can significantly reduce the
lifeguard overhead.
Idempotent filters for metadata checks
Checking metadata states upon observing
certain application events is a fundamental
operation of any lifeguard. Whereas some
lifeguards, such as TaintCheck, perform
only a modest number of checks, others per-
form checks frequently—AddrCheck, Mem-
Check, and LockSet check every memory
operation. However, many checks are idem-
potent (and thus redundant). For example,
once AddrCheck checks that a memory loca-
tion is allocated, subsequent loads and stores
to the same address need not be checked
until the next free event.
Thus, we designed an idempotent
filter (IF) to reduce lifeguard checking over-
head. The idea is to introduce a lifeguard-
configurable IF cache of recently observed
checking events. If an incoming event hits
in the cache, it is discarded (filtered). Upon
a miss in the IF cache, an event E is delivered
to the lifeguard. If E is configured to
be cacheable, it is inserted into the IF cache
with the LRU replacement policy.
Because different lifeguards have different
checking requirements, the IF hardware
extends the event type configuration table
(ETCT), which specifies event handler
addresses, to include several fields that control
IF behavior. First, a cacheable bit specifies
whether the lifeguard classifies the event as
checking-only (nonupdating). If set, events
of that type can be filtered by the IF cache.
Second, a check categorization (CC) field
lets lifeguards specify whether two event
types result in the same checks (such as load
and store events in AddrCheck). Third,
there is a cacheable bit for every field of the
instruction record. A line in the IF cache con-
sists of the CC value and the set of selected
record field values. The line is indexed by a
hash code computed from the entire line. If
the CC value and the selected fields of an
incoming event match an existing cache
entry, the hardware considers it a hit and
assumes that the two events are idempotent.
For example, AddrCheck would use the
same CC value for load and store event
types, and specify that the memory address
and the size fields are cacheable. MemCheck
employs IF similarly for accessibility check-
ing. In contrast, LockSet must treat load
and store operations separately with different
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categorization values. (Surprisingly, IF does
apply to LockSet because intersecting with
a set twice does not shrink the result further.)
Moreover, the ETCT specifies invalida-
tion policies for the IF cache. Checks are
only idempotent as long as the underlying
metadata remain unmodified. If the relevant
metadata changes, cached checks must be
invalidated. We further augment the ETCT
with two bits: one indicating whether an
event of this type invalidates the entire IF
cache (for example, malloc/free calls
or system calls), and one indicating whether
the event invalidates records that match the
specified CC value and selected fields of
the event.
Perhaps most interestingly, we find that
relatively small cache sizes (for example, 32
entries) and set-associativity (for example,
4-way) are remarkably useful for idempotent
filtering in our experiments.
Metadata-TLB for metadata mapping
Instruction-grain lifeguards keep meta-
data for every byte or word in the address
space of the monitored applications that
is consulted, updated, or both for each
(unfiltered) memory reference event. For
space efficiency and flexibility, such life-
guards often use a two-level metadata
organization,4 which employs an indexing
structure similar to a page table to perform
the translation between application and
metadata addresses.
However, the one negative attribute of
the two-level structure is performance,
because the extra level of indirection
requires additional lifeguard instructions
and memory references. Figure 3 shows a
representative event handler in TaintCheck
that combines the taint of a memory loca-
tion and a register. The left side of the fig-
ure shows the original C code along with
the generated IA32 instructions. Of the
eight instructions, the first five perform
metadata mapping, accounting for more
than half of the instructions in this han-
dler! Our goal is to achieve the advantages
of the two-level design while minimizing
the cost.
Noting that the two-level metadata struc-
ture resembles page tables, we propose a
hardware translation look-aside buffer mech-
anism, metadata-TLB (M-TLB), for solving
the performance problem. Rather than trans-
lating virtual addresses to physical ones,
M-TLB translates application-space virtual
addresses to lifeguard-space (metadata) vir-
tual addresses. An application data address
consists of three parts: the highest part
is the level-1 index, the middle part is
the level-2 index, and the lowest part is the
index into each level-2 element. The level-1
index is used to look up M-TLB for the
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void dest_reg_op_mem_4B (UINT32 src_addr, UINT32 dest_reg)
// app event type: dest_reg = dest_reg op  mem(src_addr)
// handler: reg_taint(dest_reg)|=mem_taint(src_addr)
// src_addr is in %eax, dest_reg is in %edx
map *mp=level1_index[src_addr>>16];
// mov %eax, %ecx
// shr $16, %ecx
// mov level1_index(,%ecx,4),%ecx
int idx=(src_addr & 0xffff)>>2;
// and $0xffff, %eax
// shr $2, %eax
UChar mem_taint=mp[idx];
// movzbl (%ecx,%eax,1), %eax
reg_taint[dest_reg]|= mem_taint;
// or %al, reg_taint(%edx)
next_lba_record ();
// nlba
UChar *p = LMA_macro(src_addr);
// LMA %eax, %ecx
UChar mem_taint = *p;
// mov (%ecx), %al
reg_taint[dest_reg]|=mem_taint;
// or %al, reg_taint(%edx)
next_lba_record ();
// nlba
Applying LMA
Figure 3. Applying the load metadata address (LMA) instruction to a TaintCheck event han-
dler. The two-level metadata structure consists of a 16-bit level-1 index, a 14-bit level-2
index, and a 2-bit in-byte offset. TaintCheck uses 2-bit tainted metadata so that the
frequent 4-byte operations on IA32 are handled with 1-byte metadata accesses.
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starting address of the level-2 metadata
chunk. Simple hardware structures perform
the required shift and mask operations. More-
over, M-TLB is managed by lifeguards, min-
imizing the need for OS support: Upon an
M-TLB miss, a configured software handler
is called to insert new entries into the M-TLB.
In the context of the IA32 architecture,
we propose to expose M-TLB through
a new instruction, lma (load metadata
address), which translates an application ad-
dress and puts the metadata address into a
specified register. As Figure 3 shows, such
a mechanism lets us replace the first
five instructions (left side) with a single
lma instruction (right side), thus reducing
the handler’s instruction count by half.
We made the following design choices.
First, to reduce hardware complexity, lma
only performs address translation; it does
not issue any memory accesses for metadata.
Second, to support flexible lifeguard meta-
data, our design lets lifeguards configure the
mapping parameters with a lma_config
instruction. Third, for the same reason,
lma only computes the starting (byte)
address of a level-2 element; the lifeguard
must determine the offset of fields within
an element (for example, which bit corre-
sponds to the taint of an application byte).
In our experience, this does not incur signifi-
cant overhead, because, as Figure 3 shows,
lifeguards can often use an entire level-2 ele-
ment as the most frequently accessed size.
Experimental evaluations
We implemented LBA by extending the
Virtutech Simics full-system simulation
platform with log record capture and
event dispatch support. The three proposed
techniques—inheritance tracking (IT), idem-
potent filters (IF), and load metadata address
(LMA)—are implemented in the event dis-
patch module, and are individually configu-
rable by the lifeguard software.
Our simulation models a dual-core IA32
system with a two-level cache hierarchy aug-
mented with LBA, running an application
on one core and a lifeguard monitoring the
application on a second core. The log
buffer occupies 1/8 of the L2 cache. In the
simulation, we assumed an 8-entry IT table
(for eight general-purpose IA32 registers), a
32-entry fully-associative cache for the IF fil-
ter, and 1-cycle latency for the LMA instruc-
tion. The simulation also models interference
of log accesses to the application and lifeguard.
We implemented five diverse life-
guards: AddrCheck, MemCheck, Taint-
Check, TaintCheck with detailed tracking,
and LockSet. We chose CPU-intensive
SPEC2000 integer benchmarks to ‘‘stress test’’
instruction-grain monitoring.We used the test
inputs due to simulation time constraints. For
the data race detection lifeguard, LockSet, we
chosefiveCPU-intensivemultithreadedbench-
marks and ran all the application threads on
core 1.We ran all benchmarks to completion.
Figure 4 shows the performance im-
provements we achieved by applying
our three techniques one by one (LMA on
top of M-TLB for metadata mapping, IT
for metadata updates, and IF for metadata
checks). Compared with the LBA baseline,
our framework achieves a 2 to 3 reduc-
tion in LBA’s overheads for all of the
studied lifeguards, with overall slowdowns
of 2 to 51 percent for all but MemCheck.
Because MemCheck performs propagation,
checks memory accesses, and checks binary
operands, its cost is larger than the sum of
AddrCheck and TaintCheck, as expected.
Moreover, we evaluate the design param-
eters of our techniques with a profiling study
using Pin.5 We instrumented the benchmark
executables to obtain memory access, propa-
gation, and address computation events.
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Figure 4. Performance benefits of applying inheritance tracking (IT), idempo-
tent filters (IF), and load metadata address (LMA) to five diverse lifeguards.
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We built three Pin modules that model the
IT, IF, and M-TLB mechanisms. The mod-
ules take the events as input and collect statis-
tics on miss rates and filtered events. In
contrast to the simulation study, we used the
full ref input for SPEC2000 integer bench-
marks. Our profiling results show that IT
removes 35.8 percent to 82.0 percent of the
propagation events, that an IF design with a
set associativity of 4 or more works as well
as the fully-associative design, and that our
M-TLB design with flexible level-1 bits
achieves less than 1 percent M-TLB miss rates.
Software complexity is increasing to un-precedented levels, commensurate with
hardware design size and complexity, and
system robustness is becoming critical as
computers tackle day-to-day problems with
increasing demands on reliability and security.
Instruction-grain lifeguards offer a promising
solution to this confluence of challenges. Our
hardware acceleration framework—employing
inheritance tracking, idempotent filters, and
metadata TLBs—can significantly reduce the
major sources of overheads in such lifeguards.
Combined with LBA, our framework is the
first major work to show a fully general-
purpose lifeguard framework with low enough
overheads to be deployed in the field without
resorting to sampling. Our work presents a
firm step toward addressing the long-term
challenge of software reliability. MICRO
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